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ABSTRACT 
 
In response to critical comments by Bengt-Åke Lundvall and Edward Steinmueller, I argue 
that we need to understand why the economic crisis has been so long, so deep and so wide. 
Even though it originated in the financial sector, a recovery has not yet materialised because 
existing and potential technological opportunities have not been exploited. An innovation-
based recovery will need to take advantage of these opportunities and will also require a 
favourable institutional environment. Pro-active public intervention in science and 
technology will additionally be required, combined with new social imagination. 
 
  
On the origin and persistence of the crisis 
I am grateful to Lundvall (2016) and Steinmueller (2016) for commenting on Blade Runner 
Economics. Their remarks contain many fruitful insights and, even though we belong to the 
same neo-Schumpeterian school of thought, there are important disagreements. The first 
relates to the origin of the 2008 crisis and the reasons for its persistence. 
Lundvall and Steinmueller rightly recall that the origin of the 2008 crisis was primarily due to 
unscrupulous behaviour in the financial sector rather than problems associated with the real 
economy. When interviewed by the House Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform, former Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan, was forced to admit he had been 
far too optimistic about the self-regulatory capabilities of financial markets.
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 Greenspan’s 
admission validates those heterodox thinkers, including Lundvall, who already in the 1990s 
were warning of the impending instability of the economic expansion but who unfortunately 
were not taken seriously by policy-makers. 
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When in November 2008 Queen Elisabeth II visited one of the great temples of economic 
wisdom, the London School of Economics, she asked with regard to the crisis: "Why did 
nobody notice it?", expressing the puzzlement felt by many.
2
 In a Harvard Business Review 
article I first read in 1999, the author claimed: “Many policy makers at the Fed contend that 
the new economy is a fragile bubble - and that with the ‘irrational exuberance’ of the capital 
markets, the sky is going to fall on the U.S. economy. That couldn't be further from the truth. 
As long as the government doesn't interfere the economy is sturdy, resilient, and raring to 
grow” (Sahlman, 1999). Such prophets of turbo-charged capitalism clearly over-estimated the 
stability of the system and overlooked the dangers ahead. Others were more cautious and far-
sighted. As our mentor, Christopher Freeman, stated in 2001: “No one can predict the future 
course of events with certainty. Neither the evidence about long-term productivity 
changes…., nor the scale of corporate and household debt, nor calculations of the possible 
future rate of returns on ICT investments, can conclusively show that there will be a hard 
landing for the US economy. Nevertheless, taken together, they should give cause for serious 
reflection”. The collapse of the dot.com bubble did not, unfortunately, lead to greater caution 
in subsequent years. 
We have learnt from the history of economic crises that finance often offers both the match 
that lights the fire and the wind that spreads the flames (Kindleberger, 1978). But when the 
world economy goes into such a serious recession as we have experienced since 2008, it is 
difficult to believe that a combination of financial mismanagement and poor policies can 
explain everything: there must surely be a large amount of inflammable material ready to 
catch fire and a lack of water to extinguish it. In spite of energetic public intervention to boost 
confidence and prevent the collapse of banks and companies, the economic recovery 
continues to be weak in much of the Western world. The United States is doing better than 
Europe and Japan, and some emerging countries have been doing well, but the ghost of the 
2008 economic crisis is still affecting the real economy. In particular, the rate of investment 
continues to be disappointing in spite of the fact that interest rates are very low (for a 
European analysis, see Revoltella et al., 2016). 
I am arguing that, even if finance is the single most important culprit with regard to its origin, 
this does not explain why the crisis has been so wide, so deep and so long. The basic reason 
why there has not yet been a satisfactory recovery is lack of confidence, which in turn leads 
to very low investment. Interest rates are at their lowest level historically, showing that the 
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traditional tools of macro-economic policy have already been deployed but with limited 
effect. The lack of recovery, even more than the origin of the crisis, is associated with the fact 
that new economic, social and technological opportunities are not perceived by entrepreneurs 
and investors. The gales of destruction may have being blowing for several years but the 
creativity they should have liberated has not materialised. 
If new technological opportunities had been properly exploited and brought to market, they 
could have contributed to boosting investment, creating new companies and new jobs, and 
mitigating the adverse consequences of the financial crisis. And, as has often happened 
previously, they could have also made up for misguided speculation, poor regulation and 
flawed government interventions. 
Where are the new opportunities? 
After a major storm, it is unlikely that investors will risk their money unless they see genuine 
opportunities. Some believe that the lack of investment is associated with an exhaustion of 
scientific and technological opportunities (Gordon, 2016), certainly not the first time this has 
been predicted. I disagree. I see this as a re-occurrence of the technological anxiety that has 
been disproved by history on numerous occasions (Mokyr et al., 2015). As the long-wave 
literature has indicated, a new economic phase should be based on a combination of new 
opportunities as well as the exploitation of existing knowledge. Biotech is the obvious 
candidate to become the leading sector of the next economic phase, and Blade Runner 
provides a powerful visual forecast. But there is still a missing link between new technologies 
and innovations which needs to be further investigated by science policy scholars. 
Who is leading the dance? 
I agree with Lundvall and Steinmueller that new technologies by themselves will not affect a 
change to society unless there is the infrastructure that allows for it. Any major general 
purpose infrastructure built during the history of capitalism needed the combined contribution 
of the public and business sectors, as the examples of electrification, air travel and internet 
navigation have shown. 150 years ago, Marx identified the relationship between the 
economic base and the cultural and political superstructure as a key component of capitalist 
development (Marx, 1859/1977). Similarly, Perez (2003) stressed that economic crises are 
likely to be associated with a mismatch between the technological infrastructure and the 
socio-economic fabric, while periods of expansion are generally related to better coordination 
between the two. The long-wave tradition has further explored these insights, trying to create 
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a periodization and associating with each phase specific dominant technologies, production 
modes, and social and political institutions (Tylecote, 1992; Freeman and Louca, 2001). 
Lundvall argues that the failure to achieve full recovery is mostly due to a lack of appropriate 
political conditions and that “politics and new forms of governance will matter more than the 
economy and technology for the eventual upswing and sustained economic growth”. He 
suggests that political reform will lead the dance and that, in its absence, a new techno-
economic regime is unlikely to emerge. I am not convinced. There is often a process of co-
evolution between technological potential and politics that is difficult to predict. Marx was 
astute in terming the relationship between the base and super-structure ‘dialectical’, and 
perhaps we should continue to follow his lead: in most cases, we only manage to establish 
who has actually led the dance once the music is over. 
Certainly technological opportunities need to be shaped to the social context and this is often 
associated with deliberate policy choices. In several cases such as with automobiles, the 
decision to develop adequate public infrastructure to allow cars to travel followed what the 
business sector had created: powerful lobbies of industrialists and motorists managed to 
obtain from governments what they needed. Indeed, the automobile technological paradigm 
proved so strong that neither the Soviet Union nor China managed to stop it. 
However, I accept Lundvall’s and Steinmueller’s reproach for having somewhat overlooked 
the role of government in shaping opportunities. If we succeeded in landing on the moon but 
not in sorting out the problem of urban ghettos (to echo Richard Nelson’s (1977; 2011) 
metaphor), it is because political attention, knowledge and funding were directed towards one 
objective rather than another. My colleagues are therefore right to stress that public policies 
should explore which scientific and technological areas could be developed and how they 
may change our lives, as should scholars and policy-advisors in the area of research and 
innovation policy. Public institutions should be able to outline the desired outcome, also 
trying to overcome what is often the tyranny of technological opportunities. We need to 
revert to major involvement of the public sector in steering, selecting and assessing scientific 
and technological opportunities. Mazzucato (2013) has clearly shown the relevance of the 
public sector in shaping technological opportunities. In many cases, the public sector has 
opened up new areas that the business sector has been happy to exploit. If scientific and 
technological opportunities are not available as we need them, this is also associated to a 
dangerous retreat of the public sector from knowledge creating (Archibugi and Filippetti, 
2016). 
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The changing geography of innovation 
Often, a change in techno-economic paradigm is also associated with a change in economic 
and political leadership. Lundvall rightly points out that new emerging regions are gaining 
ground, eroding the privileged position of the triad of North America, Europe and Japan. As 
the founder and motivating force of Globelics, a highly successful network of academics and 
policy advisers, Lundvall is certainly ideally placed to observe how fast the world is changing 
and how certain regions are catching up (see Lundvall et al., 2009; see also Archibugi and 
Filippetti, 2015). Those predicting secular stagnation tend to focus on an American or 
Western perspective, not on emerging nations (Gordon, 2016). Yet given that China and India 
achieved average annual growth rates of 8.6% and 7.0% respectively in the post-crisis period 
2008-2015, they can hardly be considered as stagnant.
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Nevertheless, one doubts whether a major new techno-economic paradigm will emerge from 
outside the triad. Emerging countries like China and India are certainly increasing their R&D 
spending, and already by 2014 Chinese R&D intensity had overtaken Europe and within a 
decade it may be higher than in the US (Battelle, 2016, p. 13). However, from data on the 
impact of scientific articles and on patents, it would seem that emerging countries are still 
catching-up with the triad (see Iammarino and McCann, 2013; Zhou and Li, 2015). Outside 
the scientific and technological domain, one has yet to see the emergence of significant social 
and political innovations that might offer an alternative path to the triad. 
The next techno-economic paradigm will also need a new socio-political infrastructure. We 
are far from being satisfied with what, thus far, has been delivered under capitalist 
democracy. Indeed, in the search for a new model it will be vital to integrate other regions of 
the world, allowing them to become not just rule-takers but also rule-makers.
4
 Many of us are 
eager to learn from new experiences in the political and organizational domains, but up to 
now, most emerging countries have apparently been merely adapting to what is offered in the 
triad. In the political domain, an alternative to Western democracy is yet to emerge, with the 
BRIC countries struggling to introduce (as in the case of China) or consolidate (as in Brazil, 
India and Russia) such a model. A new techno-economic paradigm as well as a new form of 
social organization is more likely to emerge in the West than in the rest of the world. 
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Social imagination and technological innovation.  
For several decades, the Schumpeterian school focused on technological innovations, 
particularly those in manufacturing. Only rather slowly has our attention (and our data) been 
directed towards the service economy (Gallouj and Savona, 2009) and non-technological 
innovations (Smith, 2005). Technological innovations in manufacturing have often been the 
driver for larger social transformations, but the time is ripe to consider the wider context of 
innovation. Significantly, the Community Innovation Survey, the largest quantitative exercise 
to assess innovation, has dropped the qualification of “technological” and is now devoted to 
exploring ‘innovation’ in all its forms, and has included the service sector on a par with 
manufacturing.  
But it is time to go further. If we really wish to understand how changes affect society, and 
what are the main obstacles to their introduction, we also need to identify how the 
government and the non-profit sectors contribute to innovation and how social transformation 
is linked to technological and economic factors. A new stream of research is today devoted to 
‘social’ innovations, showing that many have been facilitated by the availability of new 
technologies. Take the case of what has been labelled the “sharing economy”: exchanging 
homes, automobiles and personal services is largely possible because the Internet allows it to 
be done cheaply and quickly. This has generated new clusters of opportunities that both profit 
and non-profit organizations are exploiting. All this has often occurred in the absence of 
political interest and economic regulation. 
The search for a new techno-economic paradigm is not a task for scientists, engineers and 
businessmen alone. New ideas often originate in other social contexts. Steinmueller, a 
devotee of science fiction, rightly reminds us that most contemporary science fiction is 
dystopian rather than utopian: artistic imagination is more likely to be captured by the 
dangers associated with human progress rather than the opportunities it opens up. Italian 
teachers know very well that their students are fascinated by Dante’s Inferno rather than by 
Paradiso, suggesting humans have an intrinsic predisposition towards pessimism. Despite the 
steady increase in life expectancy, the more extensive concerns about climate change suggest 
that film-makers and writers may be more in tune with the human psyche than politicians and 
businessmen. Perhaps it is time to challenge such pessimism and deliberately to go back to 
the original meaning of utopia of Thomas Moore, Tommaso Campanella and Frances Bacon; 
an exercise in which artists and engineers, film-makers and political theorists, architects and 
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businessmen attempt to imagine how existing scientific and technological opportunities can 
be exploited and incorporated in the social fabric – in short, how another world is possible. 
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